We argue that one prime source of Commission autonomy in bilateral trade negotiations was the informational advantage that it acquired during the pre-negotiations, which is the phase preceding the adoption of negotiating directives by the Council. Initially, the Commission was entirely unmonitored due to the lack of Treaty provisions applying to this stage in the negotiations. The Commission used this information asymmetry strategically vis-à-vis the Council to move outcomes closer to its ideal point. Later, Member States have stepped up police-patrol monitoring manifesting itself empirically through two different channels. First, they have shifted the institutional arena for more political aspects to annual ministerial meetings. Second, preparatory works on a technical level are today followed by national experts. We examine this argument by adopting a principal-agent perspective and against the backdrop of EU-India relations.
INTRODUCTION
Who shapes bilateral trade negotiations in the European Union (EU)? Is it the European Commission, which is charged by the Treaty to conduct them? Or the Council, which has the power to conclude them? While some scholars find a significant degree of Commission 1 autonomy (e.g. Conceição-Heldt 2011; Elgström and Larsén 2010; Elsig and Dupont 2012; Larsén 2007) , others emphasise Member State control (e.g. Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004: 226-7; Damro 2007; Kerremans 2004; Meunier 2005) . This paper lends support to the former camp for earlier negotiations, but shifts into the latter for more contemporary ones.
We argue that in bilateral trade negotiations asymmetric information was a prime source of Commission autonomy, which we define as the 'successful pursuit of a private agenda' (Tallberg 2000: 844) . The Commission acquired exclusive information in the pre-negotiations, i.e.
the phase preceding the official negotiations starting with the adoption of negotiating directives by the Council. As this stage in the negotiations is not covered by the Treaty, the Commission was initially entirely unmonitored by Member States. This gave the Commission a preview of third-party preferences-perhaps even a chance to shape them to some extent-which it could use strategically vis-à-vis the Council to move the negotiations closer to its 'ideal point', at which actors attain their most preferred policy outcome (Milner 1997: 33) . Member States have later plugged this source of private Commission information through the introduction of new police patrols. First, Member States shifted the arena for more political aspects of the pre-negotiations to annual ministerial meetings. Here Member States are represented either in full or through the Council Presidency and can exert early control on where the third party expects to find room for negotiation. Second, on a more technical level negotiations are today prepared by experts sitting on the '133 Committee' 2 or the joint bodies set up through previous bilateral agreements. Member States initially opposed delegating more powers to these joint bodies but in the 1990s began to use them for their own ends. These two changes have turned around the 3 nature of the pre-negotiations from near-complete Commission autonomy to tight Council control.
This paper makes a threefold contribution to the extant literature. First, despite numerous studies applying the principal-agent (PA) framework to the EU (e.g. Dür and Elsig 2011; Franchino 2004; Kassim and Menon 2003; Pollack 2003) Working Group), joint bodies set up through previous agreements are so far entirely absent.
The data for this paper were gathered through two very diverse channels. 
KEEPING THE COMMISSION ON A SHORT(ER) LEASH
Agents hold various sources of autonomy (e.g. formal and informal agenda setting, exploiting preference heterogeneity among principals, or cultivating relations with societal stakeholders).
But asymmetric information is certainly among the most important. As Pollack succinctly states, '[t] he importance in this context of information, and of asymmetrically distributed information in particular, can scarcely be overstated ' (2003: 26) . Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991: 25) also note that situations where agents acquire private information pervade public policy-making. Thinking in more causal terms, Zimmermann (2004: 75) identifies private information as the 'core factor' for Commission autonomy in trade negotiations due to the loss of Member
States' ability to follow minute details. Nicolaïdis (1999: 91) argues that the Commission knows preferences of each Member State better than states individually, which opens up scope for autonomous action. Conceição-Heldt (2011: 413) identifies another causal mechanism in the Commission's ability to control, at least to some extent, how much and which information the Council obtains. Finally, Elsig and Dupont (2012: 504) and Ripoll Servent (2014) point at the agent's ability to 'collude' with the third party. We agree that forming a strategic interaction with the EU's negotiating partner can be a powerful source of Commission autonomy.
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Any discussion of agent autonomy is incomplete without regard to principal control. Principals introduce elements of control in the delegation design to overcome delegation losses. But all checks on erroneous agent behaviour come at a cost. First, principals face opportunity costs as control mechanisms in one policy field means forgoing their establishment in others, provided the overall resources available are inelastic at least in the short-term (McCubbins et al. 1987: 247) . Moreover, principals' sanctions are only roughly comparable to 'sanctions' available to agents. Both can negatively influence career perspectives and thwart the other from realizing preferred policy outcomes. In the absence of more drastic mechanisms, monitoring 'should be intensive so that the limits to sanctions can be offset to some degree by higher detection probabilities ' (McCubbins et al. 1987: 251) . McCubbins and Schwartz (1984: 166) where it expects disclosure to move negotiations in the direction of its ideal point. Where the 7 preferences of Commission, third party and privileged Member State(s) overlap-and we believe based on the insight gleaned from archival material this typically to be the case as all these parties favour comprehensive agreements-no information with the wider Council will be shared. Establishing collective means of control should thus be the Council's clear priority.
The delegation of authority to negotiate trade agreements in the EU is a two-step process (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 1999: 480) . The first step is from sovereign Member States to the EU through the Treaty on the constitutional level (vertical delegation). The second step is from the Council to the Commission through the negotiating directives at the institutional level (horizontal delegation). Focusing on the first step in this paper, we note that article 133 TEC (ex 113, 207 TFEU) is explicit that trade negotiations should be conducted in line with Council directives and in consultation with a special committee. Since the Nice Treaty the Commission is tasked to 'report regularly' to this committee. The Treaty is silent, however, on how the prenegotiations should be managed.
The ensuing dynamic should be incorporated into the PA framework with respect to its impact on the informational configuration between agent and principal. Agents have incentives to structure the interaction in a way that exacerbates the information asymmetry, using any margin of interpretation in the underlying mandate in their favour (cf. Hawkins and Jacoby 2006: 206-7) . Information asymmetry therefore is not exogenously given in the PA relationship, but can be shaped through apposite agent strategies. Widening this asymmetry is particularly promising early on in the interaction, when uncertainty is generally high and actors' preferences have not yet solidly formed. This behaviour creates a reservoir of private agent information that can be tapped into to move outcomes closer to the agent's ideal point, which in turn increases principals' incentives to plug this source of delegation losses over time as the agent becomes increasingly skilled at exploiting it. Correspondingly, we argue that the lacuna in the constitutional fundamentals has at first enabled the Commission to acquire exclusive information in the prenegotiations. Member States have subsequently addressed this source of Commission-as-agent 8 autonomy by stepping up police-patrol monitoring on both political and technical levels. The next section will examine and expound this argument by comparing four BTAs with India.
In the empirical section we focus on the joint bodies created by these agreements. We describe how they initially sparked off an intense debate between Member States and the Commission. We then turn to their role in trade negotiations today. These bodies bring together representatives from the Commission and the Council alongside representatives from the third party and take a decisive role in the implementation phase, which is centrally important because uncertainty over future actions of other actors make states wary of long-term consequences of international contractual commitments (Koremenos et al. 2001: 793-5) . Furthermore, boundedly rational actors cannot foresee all future contingencies and anticipate exogenous events.
The result is that international agreements are often incomplete, sometimes setting only broad objectives and leaving actors with ample discretion to adjust their positions in the ensuing interaction (Cooley and Spruyt 2009: 8-9 ). The conclusion of BTAs thus viewed is only a starting point for EU-third party relations, which are hammered out in the joint bodies functioning as extended bargaining arenas. In analogy to EU decision making they can be compared to comitology bodies, which are among the most heavily contested among the EU institutions (e.g. Blom-Hansen 2008; Héritier 2012; Héritier and Moury 2011) and have also been analysed from a PA perspective (e.g. Ballmann et al. 2002; Franchino 2000; Pollack 2003: 114-40) . To our knowledge, this paper is the first time that they are dealt with in the literature on international negotiations.
FROM AGENT AUTONOMY TO PRINCIPAL CONTROL
In this section we present four trade agreements negotiated between the EU 4 and India in fairly between the Commission and Member States. We then illustrate how this joint EU-India body was turned into a police-patrol monitoring mechanism for technical aspects of trade negotiations. Furthermore, the changing institutional arena in which political aspects have been addressed will be surveyed.
The Commercial Co-operation Agreement
In the CCA the Commission held regular meetings with Indian officials at all levels before receiving negotiating directives from the Council. On a political level the talks opened in October 1969 with the Indian Trade Minister Bhagat visiting the Commission. 5 Around half a year later the Commission prepared a rough draft of the CCA in preparation of a visit by Indian ambassador K. B. Lall. 6 The document readily states that Indian officials had promised to comment on it, which indicates that the Commission and India discussed the agreement also on a more technical level. In April 1970 talks continued during Commission President Jean Rey's visit to India at which he met Prime Minister (PM) Indira Ghandi and several Indian ministers. 12 There is nothing in the archival material that suggests that Member States were present at this meeting. Two months later the Commission adopted a reformist position on the joint body, using about half of the entire draft negotiating directives to list its precise competences in no uncertain terms. 13 The Commission considered a strong joint body essential, arguing that it needed the flexibility to take robust measures after the CCA had come into force.
14 It is fair to assume that Commission and Indian officials discussed this aspect in their meetings. 18 In August India presented its own draft agreement, which used precise terms to describe the joint body. Among the most controversial points was India's request to enable the JC to 'improve' the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). 19 France and Italy instantly voiced concerns over the far-reaching nature of this proposal and pointed out that the GSP was an autonomous regime that should not be mentioned in any third-party agreement. The Commission drily noted that India's request was not going beyond the Council's negotiating directives. 20 Eventually two declarations were annexed to the agreement. The first stated that the EU was prepared to take India's interests into account when developing the GSP; even if not discussing it in the JC. If India requested tariff adjustments outside the GSP these could be discussed in the joint body. The second declaration provided that the EU could also channel its tariff requests through the JC to make the agreement non-preferential. 21 Even if the joint body fell short of many powers that the Commission originally envisaged, it assumed a more powerful position in EU-India relations than Member States would have preferred at the onset of the negotiations. In this case the Commission-as-agent could exploit the informational asymmetry to form a strategic interaction with the third party and move the outcome somewhat closer to its ideal point, which overlapped with that of India.
The Commercial and Economic Co-operation Agreement
The CECA saw three rounds of exploratory talks which together constitute the pre-negation phase. The political decision to negotiate a follow-up agreement goes back to a visit of Indian PM Morarji Desai to Brussels in June 1978, at which he met Commission President Roy Jenkins and the Commissioner for External Relations Wilhelm Haferkamp. 22 This again shows how that high-level meetings between the Commission and India were the exclusive institutional prerogative of the Commission at this time. India informed the EU in a verbal note of October 9 that it wishes to expand the scope of the CCA, again including the broad outlines of the future agreement. This outline recorded India's desire to allow the JC to recommend the use of funds, which caused some confusion within the Commission. In preparation of the exploratory talks it noted that the JC already had the power to recommend expenditure. The Commission therefore presumed that India wanted a more direct financial competence for the joint body, with the power to take binding decisions. As this would mark a radical departure from then-current policy, the Commission considered this outcome unlikely. As an alternative it contemplated the creation of a joint fund sponsored by both the EU and India, which the JC could manage directly. 23 A joint fund with commensurate powers to authorize payments was therefore the Commission's idea, first mooted early in the pre-negotiations.
To which extent the creation of a joint fund was discussed between the Commission and India during the exploratory talks is less clear. We know that going into the first round the Commission was prepared to discuss this issue. 24 But in the minutes itself the Commission only briefly noted that it considered a reformulation of the JC's powers to recommend expenditure. 25 In the second exploratory round the Commission stressed that the JC could not be given a direct 13 responsibility for EU development co-operation funds. But the joint body could be involved in determining priorities. 26 The final round of exploratory talks only stressed that the Commission and India concurred to strengthen the JC, particularly concerning its role in recommending expenditure. 27 Although there is no direct evidence that the Commission and India discussed the creation of a joint fund in the exploratory talks, we consider this the more plausible interpretation for four reasons. First, the Commission itself had a pronounced interest in empowering the JC. opposition. This interpretation is to some degree speculative. But considering that the negotiators of the CECA have probably consulted the documents of the CCA in preparation of the negotiations we consider it plausible. This is some support that agents also use information asymmetry by controlling, at least to some extent, how much and which information principals obtain.
India made proper funds for the JC and the power to authorize expenditure a key demand from the start. 31 As this point was not broached when debating the negotiating directives, the Commission consulted the 133 Committee which was against the proposition. 32 The third negotiating round was a repetition of the second in front of Member States' representatives. India reiterated its wish to endow the JC with funds to implement the CECA. After the Commission explained that this was against EU policy, India offered to contribute to the fund itself. 33 At an informal Commission-India meeting, the Commission made a compromise proposal including funds for the JC.
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In April 1981 negotiations entered their final stages. By this time Member States agreed that a small fund drawn from existing EU resources could be made available to the JC. But France was against commensurate powers to authorize payments, which it argued ran afoul of the EU's budgetary procedure. The Commission replied that this procedure would be fully complied with when the funds are first made available. Moreover, it was inconceivable that anybody but the JC administered the fund because of India's own contribution. 35 In an unprecedented move the Commission initialled the agreement against French reservations, including the JC's powers to 'decide' (a synonym of 'authorize') the use of any funds put at its disposal.
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The Co-operation Agreement on Partnership and Development
The turning point in terms of the Commission's ability to derive private information during the pre-negotiations came with the CAPD. India feared for its position on the EU market following the completion of the Single Market and the increasing competition from emerging market economies in Central and Eastern Europe. A host of third countries approached the EU to conclude co-operation agreements. But the Commission selected India for the first agreement reflecting the EU's increased competences in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty.
In October 1991 Commission Vice-President for External Relations and Trade Frans Andriessen visited India-still without Member States' representatives-to talk with Indian government representatives mainly about the GATT Uruguay Round. 37 The JC meeting in midNovember in New Delhi prepared the ground for deeper EU-India relations. 38 Although the EU delegation was chaired by Director-General for North-South relations Juan Prat of the Commission, national representatives were of course present at the meeting of the joint body. Eventually a Technical Working Group was set up to explore options for upgrading co-operation. 39 Exploratory talks continued in March 1992 when another EU delegation arrived in New Delhi for a four-day visit to discuss several issues, including the kind of agreement to replace the CECA. 40 The delegation was led by the Commissioner for North-South relations Abel Matutes;
but for the first time Member States were represented by the troika in the pre-negotiations. The
Foreign Minister of Portugal (Presidency-in-office) as well as the deputy ministers from the Netherlands (preceding Portugal as Council Presidency) and the UK (following Portugal) joined the delegation. 41 Member States shifted the pre-negotiations into arenas where the Commission no longer enjoyed the monopoly of defining the EU's position early in the negotiations and plugged an important source of agent autonomy through the expansion of police patrols.
In September the Commission forwarded its draft negotiating directives to the Council.
Adoption of the directives plus the negotiation of the agreement took only four months, which makes the CAPD one of the most rapidly negotiated BTAs ever. The JC's functions were essentially carried over from the CECA. But the CAPD expanded co-operation into a host of new issue areas that could henceforth be tackled within the joint body. In fact, the CAPD is best known for the ensuing judicial conflict that reflects this expansion. The Commission and most Member States used the development co-operation Art. 130y TEC for ratification, which was inserted into the Treaty at Maastricht. Portugal and Greece contested this legal basis arguing that issues such as human rights or money laundering, which were also included, required unanimity. But the ECJ eventually upheld the conclusion of co-operation agreements by qualified majority voting (Peers 1998 ).
The Free Trade Agreement
Member States assuming a greater role in the pre-negotiations continued with the FTA. The The leaders agreed on a 22-point action plan, inter alia resolving to enhance bilateral dialogue at all levels: HoSG, ministers, senior officials and experts. The HLTG was charged to examine the prospects of concluding a FTA. 50 The following month the JC decided that the first meeting should be convened quickly. 51 The HLTG met for a first preliminary meeting in Brussels in November but the first formal meeting took place in New Fourth, our research yields some insight into the negotiation of multilateral trade agreements by contrasting it with the bilateral case. Multilateral negotiations unfold in a very different manner and without pre-negotiations comparable to those encountered in BTAs. Nevertheless, it is striking that Commission interactions with third-party states before the Council issues its negotiating directives are entirely disregarded (e.g. Woolcock 2015: 394). Moreover, while the support of certain third parties is crucial, the multiplicity of involved actors makes forming durable strategic interaction(s) increasingly difficult. While agreement between the EU and US used to be a largely sufficient condition to conclude rounds, since Uruguay the multilateral trading system has become multipolar owing to the rise of emerging powers such as Brazil, India or China (Young and Peterson 2006: 802-3) . This trend could help explain why analysts of bilateral negotiations seem more sanguine about the Commission's ability to shape outcomes than experts on multilateral negotiations. Whether the EU's recent turn away from the multilateral venue towards a more bilateral approach plays into the Commission's hands depends on its level of autonomy in bilateral negotiations today. Our conjecture is that-in spite of the longerterm dynamics captured by our paper-the Commission still enjoys more leeway bilaterally than multilaterally because of relatively higher levels of private information and greater oppor-tunities for strategic interactions. Generally, scholars should seek to systematically identify differences and similarities of bilateral and multilateral (trade) negotiations from an EU policymaking perspective. 
